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The “sharing economy” generates a new form of economic activity through 
digital platforms, allowing people to create and share goods and services with one 
another.  Representative of a generational shift in consumer values and purchasing 
preferences, the sharing economy is diverse, and continues to grow every day with 
different types of online applications that provide goods, services, rides, vacation 
stays, money, clothes, and more to consumers in ways previously unimagined.  
Transformative in some respects, overhyped in others,1 the sharing economy con-
tinues to grow in the absence of law needed to regulate it.2  This primarily peer-to-
peer industry has taken the world by storm, and industry growth does not appear to 
be slowing down.3  Beyond the stand out companies that offer ride-sharing and 
home-sharing services, consumers can also borrow a car on Turo,4 connect to some-
one else’s WiFi on Fon,5 and find a pet-sitter on DogVacay.6 
In common with the prevalence of (and attendant access to litigation concerns 
raised by) arbitration clauses governing traditional consumer and employment 
agreements, as the sharing economy evolves, similar concerns are raised about the 
force of arbitration in this new arena.  Many sharing economy companies contain 
an arbitration clause in their Terms of Use agreements.  Consumers “agree that any 
dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to [the] Terms . . . will be 
settled by binding arbitration,” and yet, consumers continue to file lawsuits against 
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 1. Reid Cramer, How the Sharing Economy Is Hurting Millennials, TIME (June 29, 2015), 
http://time.com/3939850/sharing-economy-pitfalls/. 
 2. Alberto Marchi and Ellora-Julie Parekh, How the sharing economy can make its case, MCKINSEY 
Q. (Dec. 2015), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-in-
sights/how-the-sharing-economy-can-make-its-case. 
 3. In a study conducted by the Pew Research Center for Internet, Science & Tech, it was found that 
72% of American adults have used at least one of 11 different shared and on-demand services.  Further, 
some incorporate a variety of these services into their daily lives.  The study showed that around one-in-
five Americans have used four or more of these services, and 7% have used six or more.  Aaron Smith, 
Shared, Collaborative and On Demand: The New Digital Economy, PEW RES. CTR. (May 19, 2016), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/05/19/the-new-digital-economy/. 
 4. People can either rent a car or list their own for someone else to borrow on Turo. See How Turo 
Works, TURO, https://turo.com/how-turo-works (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
 5. Fon is a global WiFi network with a unique crowdsourcing approach where members can share 
their WiFi access with consumers. Fon currently offers 20,365,961 hotspots around the world. See Fon 
Network, FON, https://network.fon.com/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
 6. DogVacay matches users with pet-sitters. See How DogVacay Works, DOGVACAY, https://dogva-
cay.com/how-it-works (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
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companies like Uber.  Over the years, consumers have challenged binding arbitra-
tion clauses within the traditional economy upon realizing the limitations concern-
ing access to the courts.7  These concerns regarding access to the courts (arguably 
limited by binding arbitration) in the traditional economy are now carrying over 
into the sharing economy.8 
No regulatory scheme exists that encompasses sharing economy issues regard-
ing taxation, insurance, and employment to name a few.9  Consequently, the courts 
have been addressing some of these questions, while leaving others to arbitration.  
For example, Uber has successfully compelled arbitration in multiple instances, but 
many cases are remanded to California district courts for further consideration re-
garding the employment status of Uber drivers.  In O’Connor, a group of current 
and former Uber drivers filed a class action suit alleging that drivers were employ-
ees rather than independent contractors.10  The case is currently under reconsidera-
tion regarding the enforceability of an arbitration clause within Uber’s most recent 
Terms of Use.11  If the court finds the arbitration cause enforceable, a vast majority 
of the O’Connor class will be forced to arbitrate.  A result like this would not only 
jeopardize the viability this class, but the possibility of future class action suits 
against Uber.12 
This Comment will explicate the successes and failures of sharing economy 
arbitration clauses, and discuss the future legal climate for companies like Airbnb 
and Uber.  First, this Comment will give an overview of the sharing economy and 
its current legal implications, then it will provide an overview of arbitration clauses 
and their success in sharing economy contract agreements, and finally, it will eval-
uate the potential advantages and disadvantages of arbitration clauses in the future 
based on a current labor and employment suits pending against Uber. 
                                                          
 7. This article highlights the prevalence of arbitration clauses within multiple traditional economy 
industries such as applying for a credit card, using a cell phone, getting cable or Internet service, or 
shopping online.  Furthermore, the article discusses multiple lawsuits and previous attempts by consum-
ers to find these arbitration clauses unconscionable against companies like AT&T.  Jessica Silver-Green-
berg and Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 
2015) [hereinafter Stacking the Deck of Justice], http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/busi-
ness/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See generally Alexander Traum, Sharing Risk in the Sharing Economy: Insurance Regulation in 
the Age of Uber, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 511 (2016) (describing the current landscape 
of the sharing economy, overviews insurance regulation in the United States, exposes coverage gaps in 
the sharing economy, highlights how the sharing economy sector took early steps to fill insurance cov-
erage gaps, and surveys the ongoing insurance regulatory developments in the sharing economy); Ste-
phen Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147 (2016) 
(examines existing regulatory responses to sharing economy); Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s 
Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing Economy, 58 BOS. B.J. 6 (2014) (highlighting a number of 
legal issues raised by the sharing economy). 
 10. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2016 WL 4398271, *1 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (order denying prelimi-
nary approval). 
 11. Id. at *19. 
 12. Id. at *9.  Although Uber’s Terms of Use includes a class arbitration waiver, there is also a 
“Changes” section that allows users to opt out of the arbitration agreement within thirty days of accepting 
the Terms of Use, thus allowing the possibility of a class action suit.  See Terms of Use, UBER, 
https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
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II. SHARING ECONOMY 
A. What is the “sharing economy”? 
There are multiple ways to define “sharing economy,” but for this Comment, 
the sharing economy is an “economic model where people are creating and sharing 
goods, services, space and money with each other.”13  It is difficult to measure how 
many sharing economy companies exist today, likely attributed to the fact that new 
companies frequently emerge.  Crowd Companies, a self-proclaimed “brand coun-
cil” that assists major companies in navigating and infiltrating the sharing economy, 
identified 460 startups in the sharing economy, and categorized them into 16 market 
sectors including provider support, learning, wellness and beauty, municipal, 
money, goods, health, space, food, utilities, mobility services, services, logistics, 
vehicle sharing, corporation and organizations, and analytics and reputation.14  An-
other source, The Mesh, which monitors the sharing economy’s growth, posits that 
there are approximately 9,731 sharing economy companies worldwide.15 
Many sharing economy companies utilize either the Internet or other digital 
platforms to cultivate peer-to-peer business.16  For example, Airbnb, a digital mar-
ketplace for people to list and book accommodations around the world, operates via 
website and smartphone application.17  Operating in over 65,000 cities and 191 
countries, Airbnb has managed to accommodate over 60 million guests since its 
founding in August of 2008.18  In addition to home-sharing, ride-sharing is another 
growing sector in the sharing economy.19  Uber, which started as a service where 
people could digitally hail a cab, now provides ride-sharing services to over 500 
cities worldwide.20  Beyond ride-sharing, Uber has expanded and become a com-
pany that delivers food for restaurants that register with UberEATS,21 and a delivery 
service for companies that register with UberRUSH.22  Not to mention, riders can 
now request premium cars with UberBLACK or UberLUX, and request rides that 
are accessible for wheelchairs or come equipped with car seats.23 
Airbnb and Uber are just two leading examples of success stories within the 
sharing economy.  There are numerous types of companies infiltrating traditional 
                                                          
 13. See About Us, CROWD COMPANIES, http://crowdcompanies.com/about.html (last visited Mar. 10, 
2017). This definition of sharing economy is from Crowd CompaniesTM, a “brand council” that assists 
major companies in navigating and infiltrating the sharing economy.  Id. 
 14. Jeremiah Owyang, Honeycomb 3.0: The Collaborative Economy Market Expansion, WEB 
STRATEGIST (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2016/03/10/honeycomb-3-0-the-col-
laborative-economy-market-expansion-sxsw/. 
 15. Mesh: The Pulse of the Sharing Economy, http://meshing.it (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).  As of 
March 2017, the site lists 9,829 sharing economy companies. Id. 
 16. See The rise of the sharing economy, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.econo-
mist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy. 
 17. See About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Smith, supra note 3. 
 20. See Our Story, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
 21. See UBEREATS, https://www.ubereats.com (last visited Mar.10, 2017). 
 22. See Small Business, UBERRUSH, https://rush.uber.com/how-it-works/ (last visited Mar. 10, 
2017). 
 23. See Ride with Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/ride/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
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marketplaces.  People can share places to park using Park Circa24, sell used clothing 
on ThredUp25, save time in the day using TaskRabbit26 or Instacart27, and even share 
capital on Propser.28  ThredUp is an example of online retail usurping the need for 
brick-and-mortar stores, and Prosper is overriding the need for traditional banks 
when consumers want to acquire a loan.  As of February 2016, twenty-four sharing 
economy companies have been valued at one billion dollars.29  Among those, eight-
een unicorns exist, meaning private start-ups valued at over one billion dollars.30 
Although most of these sharing economy companies were founded less than a 
decade ago, many are competitive, if not superior in market value, to their tradi-
tional counterparts.  For example, Airbnb has expanded to over 2,000,000 room 
listings in 191 countries, less than ten years after its founding.31  By the end of 2015, 
Airbnb raised over $100 million in a round of funding, which valued the company 
at $25.5 billion.32  As of August 2016, Airbnb is valued at $30 billion, making it the 
second-most-valuable U.S. technology startup company after Uber, valued by in-
vestors at around $68 billion.33  By comparison, traditional hotel chains have had 
much lower valuations and fewer rooms available in competing years.34  According 
to annual financial reports, by the end of 2015, Marriott had a market value of close 
to $15 billion with only 759,330 rooms in 87 countries,35 and Hilton had a market 
value of under $15 billion with only 758,000 rooms in 100 countries.36 
Like Airbnb, Uber is giving its traditional counterpart (i.e. automakers) a run 
for its money.37  As the number of car and ride-sharing companies increase, so does 
                                                          
 24. Park Circa is a digital platform that connects people who need to find a parking space with people 
who list available parking spaces for a set time.  See How It Works, PARK CIRCA, http://www.park-
circa.com/How-It-Works (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
 25. ThredUp is a digital platform for buying and selling secondhand clothes.  See About Us, THREDUP, 
https://www.thredup.com/p/about (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
 26. TaskRabbit is a help, or task-completing, service that operates on a digital platform.  TaskRabbit 
allows users to select from a list of chores, submit a request, and get paired with a “Tasker” in the area 
for a same-day appointment or future time that suits the user’s schedule.  See How It Works, 
TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/how-it-works (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
 27. Instacart is a service where users can order fresh groceries online, schedule the delivery, and then 
have the order delivered.  See How Instacart Works, INSTACART, https://www.instacart.com (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2017). 
 28. Prosper is a digital “marketplace lending platform, with over $8 billion in funded loans.”  See 
About us, PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com/plp/about/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
 29. Jeremiah Owyang & Philippe Cases, Sharing economy’s ‘billion-dollar club’ is going strong, but 
investor risk is high, VENTURE BEAT (Feb. 7, 2016 10:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2016/02/07/shar-
ing-economys-billion-dollar-club-is-going-strong-but-investor-risk-is-high/. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See AIRBNB, supra note 17. 
 32. Rolfe Winkler, Airbnb Raises Over $100 Million as It Touts Strong Growth, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
20, 2015 6:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-raises-over-100-million-as-it-touts-strong-
growth-1448049815. 
 33. Matt Rosoff, Airbnb is now worth $30 billion, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2016 4:31 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-raises-850-million-at-30-billion-valuation-2016-8. 
 34. Michael A. Cusumano, How Traditional Firms Must Compete in the Sharing Economy, COMM. 
ACM, Jan. 2015, at 33. 
 35. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 6, 15 (2015), http://files.share-
holder.com/downloads/MAR/3820327988x0x884644/934434D3-0551-4E9D-94EF-
687390A5AE6F/2015_AR.pdf. 
 36. HILTON WORLDWIDE, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 4 (2015), 
http://ir.hilton.com/~/media/Files/H/Hilton-Worldwide-IR-V3/annual-report/2015-annual-report1.pdf. 
 37. See Eric Auchard, Now roughly equal in value, Uber and Daimler trade gentle blows, REUTERS 
(June 8, 2016 8:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-uber-daimler-idUSKCN0YU2IN. 
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the threat of reduced long-term demand for new cars from automakers.38  Some 
automakers, like Daimler, have responded by investing in new car-sharing busi-
nesses.39  In June 2016, Uber was valued at $62.5 billion, worth more than the stock 
market capitalizations of automakers like BMW and GM.40 
B. Arising & Current Legal Questions 
Although the sharing economy continues to grow, regulatory mechanisms have 
not kept pace.41  Sharing economy companies implicate many legal issues, such as 
ownership rights.42  People now have the ability to share things that they do not 
necessarily own, for example, a seat in Starbucks.43  One company, Betrspot, ad-
vertises its service as a “get up,” “get out,” and “get paid” exchange where a 
“poster” can charge a “requester” to take the poster’s seat, table, couch, and even 
spot in line at a crowded location.44  Betrspot does not imply an exchange of title 
(or a sale), but rather “selectively releasing a space” to a requester.45  Similarly, 
MonkeyParking, a company founded in San Francisco that allows users to auction 
off parking spots, received a cease-and-desist letter informing MonkeyParking that 
it would face major fines, and the city would not allow businesses to hold hostage 
on-street public parking for private profit.46  That letter was released in June of 
2014, and instead of ceasing all business activities, MonkeyParking restructured its 
business model to focus on renting private property.47  The new (and legally im-
proved) MonkeyParking allows users to rent their driveway space, and is now work-
ing to partner with hotels in San Francisco to help monetize hotel parking vacan-
cies.48 
In addition to ownership issues, there are also potential taxation issues.  Some 
sharing economy participants are not required to pay certain specialty taxes.49  For 
example, it remains unclear whether Airbnb hosts are required to pay the hotel oc-
cupancy tax in most municipalities.50  The list of unsettled legal questions goes on, 
including insurance, liability, employment, zoning, licensing, and permitting is-
sues.51 
                                                          
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. BMW, or Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, had a market capitalization of $60.4 billion as of 
May 2016.  See BMW Group on the Forbes Global 2000 List, The World’s Biggest Public Companies, 
FORBES (May 2016), http://www.forbes.com/companies/bmw-group/. GM, or General Motors, had a 
market value of $49.6 billion as of May 2016.  See General Motors on the Forbes Canada’s Best Em-
plouers List, FORBES (May 2016), http://www.forbes.com/companies/general-motors/. 
 41. Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 9, at 6. 
 42. Id. at 7. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See FAQs, BETRSPOT, http://www.betrspot.com/faqs.html (last visited Mar 10, 2017). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Laura Entis, San Francisco Puts the Brakes on a Parking App Startup, ENTREPRENEUR (June 26, 
2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/235134. 
 47. Joe Eskenazi, MonkeyParking is back and ready to disrupt your driveway, SFGATE (Mar. 25, 
2015), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/MonkeyParking-is-back-and-ready-to-disrupt-your-
6158479.php. 
 48. See Press, MONEYPARKING, http://www.monkeyparking.co/press (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). 
 49. Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 9, at 7. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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One of the most apparent concerns is loss of tax revenue for state and local 
governments.52  For instance, hotels generate a special type of income tax for cities, 
which can be a major source of revenue.53  Often referred to as the transient occu-
pancy tax, this tax allows cities to collect taxes from non-residents at a rate that far 
exceeds typical sales taxes.54  The short-term rental market is usurping the existing 
hotel market, which prevents cities from collecting the transient occupancy tax.55 
Although there are obvious issues with reporting accurate tax returns while op-
erating sharing economy businesses, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has taken 
measures to help participants meet their tax reporting responsibilities.56  Recently, 
the IRS launched a new web page, the Sharing Economy Resource Center, designed 
to help taxpayers involved with the sharing economy.57  This page provides sharing 
economy participants with the resources necessary to meet tax obligations.58  Be-
cause the sharing economy has changed how people commute, travel, rent homes, 
spend vacation time, and perform other activities, the IRS found it necessary to re-
spond to this changing economic climate.59  Ranging from filing requirements to 
making quarterly estimated tax payments, the IRS’s Sharing Economy Resource 
Center offers tips and resources on a variety of topics.60 
Beyond taxation, as the sharing economy has developed, certain insurance cov-
erage gaps have begun to draw the attention of the media and politicians.61  Some 
states have implemented statutes establishing insurance coverage requirements in 
response to accidents involving ride-sharing businesses.62  For example, California 
enacted coverage and disclosure requirements, requiring Transportation Network 
Companies (TNCs) to disclose, in writing, the insurance coverage that they will 
provide to drivers.63  Further, the TNCs are required to advise a participating driver 
in writing that the driver’s personal automobile insurance policy will not provide 
coverage.64 
Colorado’s statute exempts TNCs from its definition of “common carrier.”65  
The Colorado statute, like California’s, regulates TNCs under a new section of the 
code rather than fitting it into a pre-existing common carrier statute.66  The statute 
defines a “prearranged ride” as the time that a driver has accepted a ride until the 
                                                          
 52. Miller, supra note 9, at 173. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., Cory Biggs, Who Runs San Diego: The Use and Abuse of the Transient Occupancy Tax, 
SAN DIEGO FREE PRESS (Sept. 3, 2014), http://sandiegofreepress.org/2014/09/who-runs-san-diego-the-
use-and-abuse-of-the-transient-occupancy-tax/. 
 55. Id. 
 56. IRS Launches New Sharing Economy Resource Center on IRS.gov, Provides Tips for Emerging 
Business Area, IRS (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/irs-launches-new-sharing-economy-re-
source-center-on-irsgov. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Traum, supra note 9, at 523. 
 62. Id. 
 63. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5432(a) (West 2014). California defines a TNC as an organization that 
provides prearranged transportation services for compensation using an online-enable application to con-
nect passengers with drivers using a personal vehicle. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5431(c).  Examples of 
TNCs include Uber, Lyft, Wingz, Haxi, Summon, Fasten, and Ride Austin. 
 64. Id. 
 65. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-10.1-601 to -608 (West 2015). 
 66. Id. 
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passenger is dropped off at the arranged destination.67  During the prearranged ride, 
either the TNC or driver must maintain primary insurance coverage.68  Further, the 
driver or TNC (on the driver’s behalf) must maintain insurance that expressly co-
vers TNC services.69 
Only California and Colorado had passed legislation specifically governing 
TNCs at the close of 2014.70  Since then, twenty-five more states and the District of 
Columbia have passed similar legislation.71  As the sharing economy continues to 
grow, other states will likely develop new statutory language to cover ride-sharing 
businesses and to close insurance coverage gaps. 
In addition to tax and insurance issues, sharing-economy businesses have 
blurred the distinction between employee and independent contractor.  Employment 
issues have become especially pertinent in the ride-sharing industry.  Different 
courts have utilized a variety of tests to distinguish between employees and inde-
pendent contractors; however, the application of different tests has led to courts 
reaching inconsistent classifications for ride-sharing drivers.72  Even different 
courts within the same jurisdiction that apply the same test might weigh factors 
differently in similar cases.73  For example, because Uber drivers have the ability to 
create their own work schedules, this factor gives pro-independent contractor courts 
some ammunition to declare that ride-sharing workers are independent contrac-
tors.74  On the other hand, Uber drivers are limited in ways to improve income levels 
(apart from driving more often), and Uber could not operate its business without the 
drivers, leaning towards employee status.75 
Without a clear test, courts will likely continue to disagree on the employment 
status of ride-sharing drivers.  Different tests include the right-to-control test, the 
necessary control test, the entrepreneurial opportunities test, and the economic re-
alities test.  The right-to-control test defines an employee as one who is “employed 
to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical 
conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right 
to control.”76 
The necessary control test states that an employment relationship exists if an 
employer maintains meaningful control over the business.77  For example, the Su-
preme Court of California found that although workers who harvested vegetables 
did not require persistent control because of the simplicity of the work, the employ-
ment relationship existed because the employer maintained meaningful control.78  
                                                          
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Traum, supra note 9, at 535. 
 71. Id. at 535-36. 
 72. Grant E. Brown, Note, An Uberdilemma: Employees and Independent Contractors in the Sharing 
Economy, 75 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 15, 17 (2016). 
 73. Id. at 30. 
 74. Id. at 42. 
 75. Id. at 43. 
 76. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1958)). 
 77. S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 408 (Cal. 1989). 
 78. Id. 
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The employer held pervasive control over the operation as a whole making deci-
sions about what crops to plant, supplying materials, transporting and selling the 
goods, and handing out employee checks.79 
The entrepreneurial opportunities test focuses on a person’s ability to engage 
in entrepreneurial activity in the work place.80  The D.C. Circuit applied the entre-
preneurial opportunities test to FedEx drivers and found that they were independent 
contractors because the drivers could meaningfully effect their entrepreneurial abil-
ity by selling routes for profit, substituting drivers without FedEx’s involvement, 
negotiating higher rates, and even incorporating.81 
The economic realities test determines whether a worker should be classified 
as an employee or an independent contractor by determining how much an individ-
ual depends upon the business to which they render service.82  Courts rely on six 
different factors to make this determination, none of which are dispositive: 1) de-
gree of alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which work is performed; 
2) alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on managerial skills; 
3) alleged employee’s investment in equipment, materials, and helpers required for 
the task; 4) whether the service requires a special skill; 5) degree of permanence in 
working relationship; and 6) whether the service rendered is integral to the alleged 
employer’s business.83 
The employee versus independent contractor question is prevalent in all areas 
of the economy.84  In determining which status applies to Uber drivers during a 
lawsuit, plaintiffs must first provide evidence that the drivers provided services to 
the company.85  Once this is established, California law presumes that the drivers 
are employees.86  Next, the burden shifts to Uber to rebut the employee presumption 
using Borello (or the necessary control test) to show that the drivers are not in fact 
employees, but rather, independent contractors.87  In O’Connor, the court recom-
mended that it might be time for a higher court to revise the Borello test in light of 
the sharing economy, and perhaps even more specifically to the ride-sharing econ-
omy.88  It seems necessary that either legislators create a new test, or the courts issue 
a uniform ruling.89  If not, California will continue to apply an outdated test to a 
modernized sector of the economy.90 
                                                          
 79. Id. 
 80. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  The court stated that alt-
hough the drivers have a contractual right to sell their routes for profit, FedEx tightly constrains the 
drivers’ ability to exercise this right.  Id. at 304.  Drivers may sell only to buyers approved by FedEx.  
Id.  Further, FedEx can reconfigure a route “in its sole discretion” and at any time, further constraining 
the discretion of drivers to change or sell routes.  Id. (referencing FedEx Operating Agreement). 
 81. Id. at 503. 
 82. Donovan v. Sureway Cleaners, 656 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 83. Id. (citing Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
 84. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 7. 
 85. Brian Shapiro, YEAR-IN-REVIEW: O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (2015), 
43 W. ST. L. REV. 325, 326 (2016). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 328. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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III. ARBITRATION 
A. Arbitration Agreements in Sharing-Economy Contracts 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs any arbitration agreement that is 
“a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.”91  Congress, court hold-
ings, and the language of the FAA indicate a preference towards arbitration.92  In 
authorizing the FAA, “Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and 
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims that the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”93  The Supreme 
Court has interpreted “involving commerce” as the entire permissible exercise of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power, establishing the FAA’s broad reach.94  Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court has stated that Congress’s Commerce Clause power may 
be exercised in individual cases if the economic activity in question would represent 
any practice subject to federal control, no matter if any specific effect upon inter-
state commerce exists.95 
There is a strong presumption that the FAA, not state arbitration law, provides 
the rules for arbitration when an agreement falls within the FAA’s coverage.96  Nev-
ertheless, parties are free to conduct their arbitration under state arbitration laws, so 
long as the agreement demonstrates a clear intent to do so.97  The FAA’s default 
arbitration provisions will apply if a contract includes a general choice of law pro-
vision.98  The parties must agree to conduct their arbitration according to the arbi-
tration law of a particular state; this manifests sufficient intent to arbitrate under a 
specific state’s arbitration laws.99  The reference to application of a state’s arbitra-
tion laws must be unambiguous.100 
For example, because Airbnb’s Terms of Service have a California choice-of-
law clause, California law will govern during arbitration with Airbnb.101  When 
parties mutually manifest their assent to a contract, including an arbitration provi-
sion, the provisions stated therein bind those parties.102  Although sharing economy 
companies, like Airbnb, operate primarily on the Internet or smartphone applica-
                                                          
 91. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947). 
 92. Bruce E. Meyerson, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: 15 Years Later, 71 DISP. RESOL. J. 1, 
3 (2016).  As further evidence of the strong presumption in favor of arbitration, the Supreme Court has 
stated that “as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language 
itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”  Wolff v. Westwood Mgmt., 
LLC, 558 F.3d 517, 520 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)). 
 93. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 94. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995). 
 95. Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56-57 (2003). 
 96. Sovak v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 280 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 97. Fid. Fed. Bank v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 98. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995). 
 99. Johnson v. Gruma Corp., 614 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Terms of Service § 33, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms (last visited Mar. 10, 2017); 
Aliron Intern., Inc. v. Cherokee Nation Indus., Inc., 531 F.3d 863, 865-866 (dispute as to whether parties 
agreed to arbitrate because the contract contained an Oklahoma choice-of-law clause; applied Oklahoma 
state law to arbitration). 
 102. Shatteen v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 176, 179 (D.D.C. 2015). 
9
Laughlin: Arbitration Clause Issues in Sharing Economy Contracts
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
206 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2017 
tion, “new commerce on the Internet . . . has not fundamentally changed the princi-
ples of contract.”103  Mutual manifestation of assent is fundamental to contract for-
mation; mutual assent is determined by an objective standard, which is applied to 
outward expressions of parties (i.e. the reasonable meanings of their words and acts, 
not their unexpressed intentions or understandings).104 
When signing up to use Airbnb, consumers are presented with a “clickwrap” 
agreement, meaning the user agrees to be contractually bound by the Terms of Ser-
vice by clicking on a box or button.105  By affirmatively clicking on a button saying, 
“I accept,” or some other equivalent, the user has been put on notice regarding the 
agreement to the Terms of Service, and manifests his or her agreement to those 
terms (i.e. assents to the terms).106 
Airbnb’s sign-up page is similar to Facebook’s sign-up page; the page has a 
“Sign Up” button that states “[b]y clicking Sign Up, you are indicating that you 
have read and agree to the Terms of Service,” and there is a hyperlink from that text 
to the Terms of Service themselves.107  In two different instances, federal district 
courts have held that by clicking the sign up button, and because the user had notice 
of the Terms of Service, the user agreed to, and was bound by, Facebook’s Terms 
of Service.108  Both the Northern District of California and the Southern District of 
New York found that the user was bound to the terms because of the click action.109  
Consequently, when consumers sign up to use Airbnb, they mutually assent to the 
Terms of Service, which include an arbitration clause.110 
B. The Motion to Compel: Sharing Economy Companies’ Successes and 
Failures 
During 2016, there has been a significant increase in the number of lawsuits 
against Uber, including significant litigation regarding the employment status of 
Uber drivers.111  The answer is still unclear as to whether Uber drivers are consid-
ered employees or independent contractors.  Many Uber drivers have been unable 
to get an answer from the courts, because courts often find this issue arbitrable under 
                                                          
 103. Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Register.com, Inc. 
v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 104. HM DG, Inc. v. Amini, 162 Cal. Rpts. 3d 412, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
 105. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1175-76; Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1197 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015). 
 106. Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1176-77.  There is mutual assent to terms in a clickwrap agreement when “the 
user is required to affirmatively acknowledge the agreement before proceeding with use” of the service.  
Id. 
 107. Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also In re Facebook Bio-
metric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
 108. Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 841; see also Facebook Biometric, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1166. 
 109. Facebook Biometric, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1166; see also Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (agreement 
by clicking “Sign Up” button was valid because “the user must do something else – click ‘Sign up’ – to 
assent to the hyperlinked terms”). 
 110. See Terms of Service, supra note 101. 
 111. Marisa Kendall, Uber battling more than 70 lawsuits in federal courts, THE MERCURY NEWS 
(Aug. 11, 2016 10:53 PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/07/04/uber-battling-more-than-70-law-
suits-in-federal-courts/. In 2016, Uber battled more than seventy federal lawsuits. Id. Uber was sued 
forty-six times in federal court alone in 2016. Id. Other sharing economy companies gained lawsuits in 
2016 including Airbnb (six lawsuits) and Lyft (seven lawsuits). Id. 
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Uber’s Terms and Conditions.  Below are many examples of courts granting mo-
tions to compel in favor of Uber in labor and employment disputes.  As a result, the 
question regarding Uber drivers’ legal employment status is left unanswered. 
In Arizona, David Sena, an Uber driver, filed a seven-count class action com-
plaint against Uber challenging the classification of Uber drivers as independent 
contractors.112  Uber moved to dismiss the action, compel arbitration of Sena’s 
claims, and strike the class allegations in the complaint.113  Uber succeeded on all 
three counts.114  Sena filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting Uber’s 
motion to compel arbitration.115  Sena’s motion for reconsideration was denied.116 
Another U.S. District Court followed the reasoning in Sena and decided to dis-
miss class claims against Uber, and grant Uber’s motion to compel arbitration.117  
In Maryland, Elizabeth Varon filed a complaint against Uber for various claims 
including a violation of labor laws in Maryland by treating drivers as employees, 
but not paying them accordingly.118  The district court granted Uber’s motions to 
dismiss, to compel arbitration, and to strike class allegations.119  Among other 
things, Varon argued that the arbitration clause containing a fee-splitting provision 
(requiring drivers to share the arbitration costs and pay half the arbitrator’s fee) 
rendered Uber’s arbitration agreement per se unenforceable.120  The district court 
disagreed, and followed Sena’s reasoning that the facts were not adequate to support 
a contention that the fees would be prohibitively expensive for her.121  Varon filed 
a motion for reconsideration, which was subsequently denied.122 
Similar to both Sena and Varon, Landon Bruster brought Ohio wage and labor 
claims against Uber.123  Bruster accepted the June 2014 Technology Services 
Agreement which included a class action waiver, arbitration, and delegation provi-
sions.124  Bruster had the ability to opt out of the June 2014 Agreement’s arbitration 
provision within thirty days of acceptance, but never opted out.125  Uber deactivated 
Bruster’s account (meaning Uber deactivated Bruster’s ability to use the application 
to pick up riders126) in November 2015 because of repeated unsatisfactory customer 
experiences.127  Nonetheless, on December 11, 2015, Bruster “accepted” Uber’s 
new Technology Services Agreement.128  Five days later, Bruster sent a purported 
                                                          
 112. Sena v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV-15-02418-PHX-DLR, 2016 WL 1376445, *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 7, 
2016). 
 113. Id. at *5. 
 114. Id. at *23. 
 115. Id. at *1. 
 116. Id. at *3. 
 117. Varon v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. MJG-15-3650, 2016 WL 1752835, *1 (D. Md. May 3, 2016). 
 118. Id. at *1-2. 
 119. Id. at *6. 
 120. Id. at *5. 
 121. Id. Because litigation would be the alternative forum to arbitration, courts must focus upon claim-
ant’s expected or actual arbitration costs (and the claimant’s ability to pay those costs), and compare that 
fee to the baseline of a claimant’s expected costs for litigation (and the claimant’s ability to pay those 
costs).  Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 n.5 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 122. Varon, 2016 WL 1752835, at *2. 
 123. Bruster v. Uber Techs., Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 658, 661 (N.D. Ohio 2016). 
 124. Id. at 660. 
 125. Id. at 660-61. 
 126. Complaint & Jury Demand at ¶ 35, Bruster v. Uber Techs., Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 658 (N.D. Ohio 
2016) (No. 15-CV-2653). 
 127. Bruster, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 661. 
 128. Id. at 662. 
11
Laughlin: Arbitration Clause Issues in Sharing Economy Contracts
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
208 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2017 
opt-out notice to Uber, and five days after opting out, filed a lawsuit against Uber.129  
Uber argues that the June 2014 Agreement requires Bruster’s claims to be arbi-
trated; Bruster argues that he opted out of the June 2014 Agreement after accepting 
the December 11, 2015 Agreement and sending an opt-out notice to Uber.130 
The district court stated that Uber withdrew from an ongoing contractual rela-
tion with Bruster, as a driver, when Uber deactivated Bruster’s account.131  There-
fore, Bruster’s acceptance of the December 2015 Agreement was not sufficient to 
replace the June 2014 Agreement, and the arbitration and delegation provisions of 
the June 2014 Agreement were binding on Bruster’s claim as a driver.132  The dis-
trict court granted Uber’s motions to dismiss and compel arbitration, and further 
ordered that if the arbitrator found the claims to be arbitrable, then the parties had 
to submit their claims to arbitration under the June 2014 Agreement.133  Bruster 
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was subsequently denied.134 
Horace Lee filed suit against Uber for violation of numerous Illinois labor 
laws.135  This case is another example of a United States District Court granting 
Uber’s motion to compel arbitration against drivers bringing claims for violation of 
state labor laws.136  Here, the district court agrees with the courts that have found 
Uber’s delegation clause “clear and unmistakable in delegating the question of ar-
bitrability to an arbitrator.”137  Consequently, the district court held that it could not 
address Lee’s unconscionability argument; this issue was for an arbitrator.138 
All four of the above cases resulted in successful motions to compel arbitration 
against drivers.  However, Uber has also proven successful in cases that resulted in 
motions to compel against riders.  For example, Rachel Cullinane (and others) rep-
resented a class of Massachusetts residents who alleged they were charged with 
inflated toll fees or surcharges.139  The district court found that the parties agreed to 
arbitrate, the dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration provision, and arbitra-
tion was not an illusory remedy.140  Therefore, the district court granted Uber’s mo-
tion to compel arbitration.141 
Above are examples of Uber successfully compelling arbitration clauses 
against drivers and riders filing suit.  However, Uber has also been denied motions 
to compel.  For example, Ali Razak (and other plaintiffs) brought claims under the 
                                                          
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 663. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Bruster, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 665. 
 134. Bruster v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-CV-2653, 2016 WL 4086786, *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2016). 
 135. Lee v. Uber Techs., No. 15 C 11756, 2016 WL 5417215, *1 (D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2016). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at *5; See Suarez v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 8:16-cv-166-T-30MAP, 2016 WL 2348706, *4 
(M.D. Fla. May 4, 2016) (concluding that identical language in Rasier Agreement was clear and unmis-
takable evidence of intent to arbitrate arbitrability); Varon v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. MJG-15-3650, 2016 
WL 1752835, *6 (D. Md. May 3, 2016) (same); Sena v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV-15-02418-PHX-
DLR, 2016 WL 1376445, *3-4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 7, 2016) (same). 
 138. Lee, 2016 WL 5417215, at *7. 
 139. Cullinane v. Uber Techs., No. 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652, *2 (D. Mass. July 11, 2016). 
 140. Id. at *10. 
 141. Id. 
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Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act alleg-
ing that Uber misclassified the plaintiffs as independent contractors.142  The plain-
tiffs alleged, and the district court agreed, that they had satisfactorily opted out of 
Uber’s arbitration clause.143  The district court found this was a significant factual 
distinction between this case and precedent (for example, Bruster).144  Because the 
plaintiffs complied with conditions of the opt-out procedure outlined in Uber’s 
Terms, the district court found that there was no agreement to arbitrate the issues of 
arbitrability.145  Consequently, the district court denied both Uber’s motion to com-
pel arbitration and its motion to stay the proceeding.146 
The Ninth Circuit is still grappling with the Uber driver employment status 
issue.  Abdul Mohamed, a former Uber driver, represents plaintiffs in a putative 
class action against Uber.147  The claims allege violations of the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act and various state statutes, and further, that the plaintiffs were misclassified 
as independent contractors rather than employees.148  The district court denied 
Uber’s motion to compel arbitration.149  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the dis-
trict court erred.150  This error was because the district court incorrectly assumed it 
had the authority to decide whether Uber’s arbitration clause was enforceable 
against the plaintiffs.151  The Ninth Circuit held that contractual provisions are bind-
ing, and because the opt-out agreement provision was included in the Terms and 
Conditions, the plaintiffs were bound to it.152  The plaintiffs did not opt out of the 
arbitration clause, and therefore, accepted the agreement.153 
Regardless of the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the former Uber drivers requested 
that the federal appeals court reconsider.154  Lawyers for the drivers argue that these 
arbitration pacts are not valid just because they allow drivers to opt out.155  Eventu-
ally, the question as to whether Uber drivers are employees or independent contracts 
will need to be answered to determine the scope of rights being violated in these 
cases. 
Like Uber, other TNCs have confronted litigation regarding the employment 
status of ride sharing company drivers.  For example, in Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., Bekele 
filed a class action suit against Lyft alleging that drivers were being misclassified 
                                                          
 142. Razak v. Uber Techs., No. 16-573, 2016 WL 3960556, *1 (D. Penn. July 21, 2016). 
 143. Id. at *3. 
 144. Id.  Bruster opted out of his arbitration agreement with Uber after Uber had deactivated Bruster’s 
account, or revoked his ability to pick up riders. Bruster v. Uber Techs., Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 658, 661-
62 (N.D. Ohio 2016). However, in Razak, the plaintiffs opted out of their arbitration agreements when 
still driving for Uber. Razak, 2016 WL 3960556, at *1. 
 145. Razak, 2016 WL 3960556, at *5. 
 146. Id. at *6. 
 147. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 836 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 1107. 
 153. Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 836 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2016).. 
 154. Uber Drivers Seek Review of 9th Circuit Arbitration Ruling, 31 No. 6 WESTLAW J. EMP. 12, *1 
(Oct. 11, 2016). 
 155. Id. 
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as independent contractors rather than employees.156  Lyft moved to compel arbi-
tration.157  Bekele contended that he did not receive adequate notice of the arbitra-
tion agreement, and therefore, he did not assent to it.158  The United States District 
Court in the District of Massachusetts disagreed, and granted Lyft’s motion to com-
pel arbitration.159 
The court found that Lyft satisfied the burden of demonstrating that the arbi-
tration provision in Lyft’s Terms of Service provided users with reasonable notice 
of the arbitration provision.160  The court compared the format of Lyft’s arbitration 
provision with another provision from an Uber agreement.161  The court stated that 
“Lyft’s arbitration provision was communicated in a more prominent manner than 
Uber’s arbitration provision” upheld in another case also decided in the United 
States District Court in the District of Massachusetts.162 
In another case, the United States District Court in the Northern District of 
California granted Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration against Lyft drivers.163  The 
Lyft drivers filed a class action lawsuit accusing Lyft of withholding bonus pay-
ments for drivers.164  Because Lyft did not process applications for certain drivers 
to be cleared by the Department of Motor Vehicles quickly enough, drivers were 
unable to collect a one-thousand-dollar bonus.165 
The Lyft drivers argued against arbitration, and claimed that the arbitration 
provision was an unconscionable contract of adhesion because the drivers did not 
have any power to change the terms of the agreement.166  The Northern District of 
California disagreed with the Lyft drivers, and found that there was no sufficient 
oppression or surprise to demonstrate sufficient unconscionability.167  The court 
found the arbitration provision enforceable, and granted Lyft’s motion to compel 
arbitration against the plaintiffs.168 
In addition to TNCs, other sharing economy companies have faced class action 
suits where plaintiffs allege employment misclassification.  For example, Handy is 
an online platform where users can hire an experienced, fully-equipped professional 
to show up and clean the house, paint a room, or perform other tasks around the 
home as requested by the user.169  In the United States District Court in the Northern 
District of California, Handy cleaners filed a class action lawsuit alleging that 
Handy misclassified the plaintiffs as independent contractors.170  The Handy clean-
ers alleged that because of this misclassification, Handy failed to pay overtime and 
                                                          
 156. Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 284, 288 (D. Mass. 2016). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 297. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., No. 14-14750, 2016 WL 3751652, *7 (D. Mass. July 11, 2016) 
(holding that Uber demonstrated the plaintiffs were given reasonable notice of the arbitration provision). 
 163. Loewen v. Lyft, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 945, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 164. Id. at 950. 
 165. Id. at 950-51. 
 166. Id. at 955. 
 167. Id. at 956. 
 168. Id. at 966-67. 
 169. See Book your local, trusted cleaner, HANDY, https://www.handy.com/home (last visited Apr. 5, 
2017). 
 170. Zenelaj v. Handybook Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 968, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2015).  Handy was formerly named 
Handybook. Ryan Lawler, Handybook Rebrands As Handy In An Effort To Become Amazon For Home 
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minimum wages among other claims.171  Handy moved to compel arbitration, and 
the court granted this motion in favor of Handy.172  The court stated that because 
the parties incorporated the American Arbitration Association rules into the em-
ployment agreement, the arbitrator needed to decide the arbitrability of the Handy 
cleaners’ claims.173 
Although sharing economy companies like Uber, Lyft, and Handy have re-
mained successful, some sharing economy companies cannot withstand the signif-
icant litigation costs.  For example, Homejoy, a home-cleaning marketplace com-
pany, ceased operations following four lawsuits by employees.174  The Homejoy 
cleaners claimed that they were employees as opposed to independent contrac-
tors.175  A common dilemma for startup companies like Homejoy is that many work-
ers sign up because of the flexibility, but then startups want to provide a consistent 
customer experience.176  As a result, startups will provide training and a uniform, 
and these factors imply an employee status.177  Consequently, the workers want 
certain employee benefits such as overtime pay and social security benefits. 
Other sharing economy companies, such as Airbnb, have successfully enforced 
the Terms of Service, including an arbitration agreement, against plaintiffs bringing 
suit.  Gregory Selden, an African-American man, created an Airbnb account in ad-
vance of a trip to Philadelphia.178  After creating the user profile, which includes 
posting his own photograph, Selden contacted an Airbnb “host” regarding a listed 
residence.179  The host responded that the residence was unavailable that week-
end.180  After this rejection, Selden created a new account under a pseudonym, used 
a photograph of a Caucasian person, and contacted the same host about the same 
accommodation.181  The host agreed to let the pseudonym account stay the same 
weekend that Selden had requested to stay in the listed residence.182 
Following an increase in discrimination claims against Airbnb by African-
American travelers with similar experiences to Selden, Selden filed suit against the 
Airbnb for race discrimination.183  Selden sought to hold Airbnb “responsible under 
federal civil rights laws for the discriminatory conduct of those who offer accom-
modations on its website.”184 
                                                          
Services, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 16, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/09/16/handybook-rebrands-as-
handy/. 
 171. Zenelaj, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 970. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 972.  Rule 7(a) states: “The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own juris-
diction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agree-
ment or to the arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”  Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation 
Procedures, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N (Oct. 1, 2013), 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004130. 
 174. Ellen Huet, Homejoy Shuts Down, Citing Worker Misclassification Lawsuits, FORBES (July 17, 
2015 2:58 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/17/cleaning-startup-homejoy-shuts-
down-citing-worker-misclassification-lawsuits/#61a130c578be. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-cv-00933, 2016 WL 6476934, *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2016). 
 179. Id. at *2. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at *1. 
 184. Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *1. 
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In response, Airbnb claimed that because Selden accepted the Terms of Service 
when signing up to use the site, he was required to resolve his dispute in arbitra-
tion.185  Further, Airbnb claimed that class action suits are prohibited under its 
Terms of Service.186  Airbnb filed a motion to compel arbitration of Selden’s 
claims.187  Selden responded that no contract existed (and therefore the arbitration 
clause did not apply) because he was not on adequate notice of the mandatory arbi-
tration, and further, that even if a contract was formed, the arbitration provision is 
unconscionable.188 
On November 1, 2016, the court found that Selden entered into a valid and 
enforceable arbitration agreement with Airbnb.189  Further, the court granted 
Airbnb’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to stay the case.190  The court found 
that the law in this case is clear: “[m]utual arbitration provisions in electronic con-
tracts – so long as their existence is made reasonably known to consumers – are 
enforceable, in commercial disputes and discrimination cases alike.”191  The court 
found that Airbnb’s sign-up procedure was sufficiently clear to put Selden on notice 
that he was agreeing to the Terms of Service, including the arbitration clause.192 
The court notes in its memorandum opinion accompanying the motion to com-
pel arbitration that the court is not the proper forum for policy objections, meaning 
mandatory arbitration clauses in adhesion contract issues should be taken up with 
regulators or with Congress.193 
The court found that Selden’s claim of unlawful race discrimination arose out 
of his use of Airbnb’s services.194  Therefore, his claims fell within the scope of the 
mandatory arbitration clause.195  The court rejected both arguments that the federal 
civil rights claims are not subject to arbitration and that the arbitration clause is 
unconscionable.196 
This ruling will likely have a major impact on sharing economy companies 
beyond Airbnb and home-sharing services.  For example, this means that consumers 
who claim Uber drivers are not giving them rides based on race or gender may be 
required to arbitrate any discrimination claims.  This domino effect will impact any 
consumer who uses a sharing economy service that requires providing a personal 
profile or personal information to use the services. 
IV. POTENTIAL EFFECT ON FUTURE ARBITRABILITY OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS 
Like Mohamed’s case above, there are multiple cases currently on appeal 
against Uber regarding employment status.  For example, in O’Connor, a group of 
current and former Uber drivers filed a class action suit alleging that drivers were 
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employees rather than independent contractors.197  Consequently, the drivers argued 
that they were eligible for expense reimbursement and converted tips.198  In the 
Northern District of California, the district court denied a preliminary approval of a 
proposed settlement due to inadequate settlement claims under California’s Private 
Attorneys General Act (PAGA).199 
O’Connor calls into question the future arbitrability of employment status 
claims.  Initially, the district court found the entire arbitration agreement void be-
cause of the inability to sever the PAGA waiver from the remainder of the arbitra-
tion agreement.200  Two days after the district court found the arbitration agreement 
invalid as a matter of public policy, Uber distributed a new arbitration agreement 
(December 2015 Agreement) to all Uber drivers.201  This subsequent arbitration 
agreement was also sent to the drivers that were members of pending class action 
lawsuits against Uber.202  The plaintiffs in O’Connor filed a motion to enjoin the 
December 2015 Agreement on the basis that the new agreement was meant to un-
dermine participation in the pending cases against Uber.203 
The district court declined to rule on the enforceability of the December 2015 
Agreement.204  However, it did conclude that the December 2015 Agreement could 
not be enforced unless Uber sent a review cover letter to all users and drivers re-
garding the ability to opt out of the arbitration portion of the Terms of Use.205  Uber 
argued that requiring notice of a simplified opt-out option for drivers was a violation 
of First Amendment rights.206 
Uber moved to stay the case while it sought interlocutory review of the Decem-
ber 9, 2015 Class Certification Order.207  This ruling could impact both Uber and 
the plaintiffs in different ways.  If the court finds that one or both of the arbitration 
clauses are valid and enforceable, this would likely change the scope and course of 
the lawsuit.208  Assuming both arbitration clauses are enforceable, a vast majority 
of the O’Connor class would be forced to arbitrate on their non-PAGA claims, and 
this would jeopardize the viability of the class.209  Even if only the more recent 
contracts were found enforceable, the class could decrease from 240,000 drivers to 
about 8,000 drivers.210 
Although this outcome would be dangerous to the sustainability of the class 
itself, the upshot for Uber is either a mass settlement, or substantial costs to facilitate 
the arbitration of thousands of claims.211  Because the PAGA claims cannot be com-
pelled to arbitration, the courts could still decide the employment classification 
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question.212  If a court finds that Uber drivers are employees (as opposed to inde-
pendent contractors), the statutory penalty for Uber could exceed $1 billion.213  Fur-
thermore, if a portion of the drivers is not bound by arbitration due to properly opt-
ing out, these claimants could still litigate the merits of their claims.214  If Uber lost 
the employment status question in court, this would affect the outcome of future 
arbitration agreements.215 
O’Connor has drawn significant attention, likely due to its determinative nature 
in the employment status of ride-sharing drivers.  For example, one of the plaintiff 
attorneys representing in the O’Connor case, Shannon Liss-Riordon, has created a 
webpage exclusively dedicated to the O’Connor suit.216  Another attorney, Daniel 
Rockey, has created a “Sharing law Blog” which focuses on prevalent issues in the 
sharing economy today.217  Some posts have solely focused to the O’Connor case.218 
Recurring issues within Uber’s employment disputes include the conscionabil-
ity of the arbitration clause within Uber’s Terms, and the employment status ques-
tion.  Uber drivers are joining forces, pursuing class action suits, and arguing that 
they have the right to certain benefits such as gratuity, gas money, and car mainte-
nance.219  In O’Connor, the plaintiffs claimed that Uber was tortiously interfering 
with contractual relations and receiving unjust enrichment.220  The plaintiffs 
claimed that although Uber advertised that gratuity was included in the cost of the 
ride service, plaintiffs were not receiving any of these proceeds.221  Furthermore, 
the plaintiffs claimed that Uber drivers were misclassified as independent contrac-
tors, and paying business expenses, such as gas and car maintenance fees, was a 
violation of California labor law.222  The question regarding the employment status 
of Uber drivers is still under debate. 
Although Uber drivers’ employment status remains an open question, it seems 
that the Ninth Circuit recognizes including an “opt-out” right within an arbitration 
clause deems the clause conscionable.223  Uber drivers often make the claim that the 
opt-out provision is either illusory or hidden and a violation of contract rights.224  
However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized in a number of cases that the existence 
of a meaningful right to opt-out of arbitration renders the arbitration clause proce-
durally conscionable.225  Specifically, in Mohamed, the district court acknowledged 
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that the opt-out provision in Uber’s 2014 Agreement was “highly conspicuous” and 
enabled “drivers to obtain all of the benefits of the contracts, while avoiding any 
potential burdens of arbitration.”226 
Although these pending cases deal with agreements made in the years 2013, 
2014, and 2015, Uber recently sent an email to its users stating, “Our updated Terms 
are effective as of November 21, 2016, so please make sure to read them fully (you 
can access them here).”227  Upon clicking the hyperlinked word “here,” users can 
view the updated U.S. Terms of Use (Terms) effective November 21, 2016.228  Par-
agraph three of section one, “Contractual Relationship,” states in all bold and capital 
letters to “please review the arbitration agreement set forth below carefully . . . .”229  
Further below in section two, “Arbitration Agreement,” the Terms state that “[b]y 
agreeing to the Terms, you agree that you are required to resolve any claim that you 
may have against Uber on an individual basis in arbitration, as set forth in this Ar-
bitration Agreement.”230  The clause further precludes any person from “bringing 
any class, collective, or representative action against Uber,” in “any current or fu-
ture class, collective, consolidated, or representative action brought against 
Uber.”231  The Terms reflect how Uber continues to be proactive in preventing class 
action suits. 
Within in the arbitration provision, it states that a person may “reject any such 
change by providing Uber written notice of such rejection within 30 days of the date 
such change became effective,” meaning that if Uber changes the Arbitration 
Agreement after the date that someone first agreed to the Terms, the user may opt 
of the new Terms within 30 days of the changes.232  So long as Uber continues to 
provide the opportunity to opt out of changes within the Arbitration Agreement, it 
is likely the courts will continue to support the conscionability of Uber’s Terms. 
Beyond the effect of class action employment suits against Uber, it seems that 
so long as courts recognize arbitration clauses within sharing economy contracts as 
conscionable, other companies will also succeed on their motions to compel.  Until 
a more structured regulatory system is in place, sharing economy companies will 
continue to succeed in compelling arbitration of individual claims.  Although this 
might be discouraging for litigious plaintiffs, companies such as Uber and Airbnb 
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will likely benefit from this outcome so long as consumers forget to opt out of the 
arbitration agreement. 
Courts have also recognized arbitration clauses within other kinds of sharing 
economy contracts as conscionable.  For example, in Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear, 
Inc., the United States District Court in the Northern District of California granted 
a motion to compel arbitration in favor of the sharing economy company, Insta-
cart.233  The court stated that after severing two challenged clauses, the individual 
arbitration agreement was enforceable.234  Even though the court found some of the 
clauses within the arbitration provision unconscionable, it nonetheless upheld the 
arbitration agreement, and decided that the “offending provisions may easily be 
grammatically severed without reforming the [arbitration agreements].”235 
Similar to the Cobarruviaz decision, the United States District Court in the 
Southern District of Texas granted a motion to compel arbitration in favor of a shar-
ing economy company, Dasher, after the court decided to sever the unconscionable 
elements from the arbitration agreement.236  Dasher, the defendant in this case, is 
an online platform where customers may order food and delivery items from res-
taurants.237  Plaintiff filed suit under the FLSA alleging that the plaintiff workers 
were misclassified as independent contractors, and consequently were not properly 
receiving overtime and minimum wage rates.238 
When deciding this case, the court referenced the California Civil Code that 
gives California courts the power to sever unconscionable provisions of a con-
tract.239  In this case, the court found that the cost-splitting provision coupled with 
the choice of forum provision unconscionable.240  Nonetheless, applying California 
law according the choice-of-law provision within the independent contractor agree-
ment, the court recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted and that the 
plaintiff worker be compelled to arbitrate his claims.241  After reviewing the Mag-
istrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation, the court adopted the recom-
mendation, and granted Dasher’s motion to compel arbitration against the plain-
tiff.242 
V. CONCLUSION 
So long as the sharing economy continues to grow, so do the number of ques-
tions regarding the future regulation of these companies.  In addition, certain legal 
issues, such as the employment status of Uber drivers, call into question the future 
arbitrability of employment claims against Uber.  Nonetheless, many courts find 
that employment questions fall within Uber’s arbitration clause.  Until O’Connor is 
resolved, the question as to whether TNC drivers are employees or independent 
contractors will likely remain on hold. 
                                                          
 233. Cobarruviaz v. Maplebear, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 3d 930, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 234. Id. at 943. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Edwards v. Doordash, Inc., No. H-16-2255, 2016 WL 7852532 *1, *12 (S.D. Tex. 2016). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at *12 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a)). 
 240. Edwards, 2016 WL 7852532 at *12. 
 241. Id. at *14. 
 242. Edwards v. Doordash, Inc., No. H-16-2255, 2017 WL 244862 *1 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
20
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2017, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 15
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2017/iss1/15
No. 1] Arbitration Clause Issues in Sharing Economy Contracts 217 
The need for answers to these legal questions is pivotal.  Even without answers, 
the sharing economy will continue to grow.  These highly funded and fast-growing 
companies remain the portfolio darlings of venture capital firms.  So long as the 
technology industry continues to develop, access to resources becomes much easier, 
and unicorns will continue to appear within the growing sharing economy sector. 
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